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Sarah Krakoff, Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School
MS. KRAKOFF: Thanks, and thanks again to NCAI and to Phil for pulling
this all together.
And thank you, Chairman Melendez, for coming and talking. I am happy that
many of our comments I think will dovetail very nicely.
I won't spend a lot of time on my work because I mainly want to talk about
what other work we could all be doing. I think of this as just a beginning, almost
an introduction and a framing of the kinds of work that need to be done.
Phil mentioned this morning, I think, that the title "New Realism" was
misleading and that there's nothing particularly new about the idea of doing
grounded research, and, of course, nothing particularly new about the idea of
law and empiricism.
I think there should be something new, and I think there is something new
now about the kind of empirical work that law professors are doing as opposed
to the idea about empiricism when it was first raised by the realists, and very
importantly so, back in the 1930s or so.
I think that there is, and should be, a larger degree of skepticism about this
kind of work. There should be two kinds of skepticism. First, a skepticism
about doing it the right way, and I think the comments we heard this morning
were bracing to all of us in that regard.
So you should be worried about doing shoddy empirical work, as Phil has
said. I know I am very worried about that. I'm sure everyone else in the room
feels the same way.
But there is another kind of skepticism that I think we should all have, which
is a skepticism about the work even when it goes well. Even when empirical
work is done well, there are limits to what it can tell us about the world and what
we should do in the world.
These aren't new thoughts of mine. They are informed by critical theory,
which tells us that "empirical facts" often, if not always, come to us
predetermined by cultural and political frameworks. We also might keep in
mind Mark Twain's comments about statistics, which was that there are three
kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics. That is probably putting too fine
a point on it, but I do think we need to retain the ability to judge the "facts" we
are receiving from empiricism, even while we embrace some aspects of
engaging in legal empirical research.
So we should have those thoughts in mind, and we shouldn't be under the
impression that, when we go out to find facts in the world, that we shouldn't be
skeptical of those facts.
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One additional framing comment is that we shouldn't be too optimistic about
the way that we might be able to influence decision makers, even when we do
very rigorous, careful and convincing empirical research. So here I have some
thoughts about audience. On the one hand, it is very important that we think of
our audience as being the Supreme Court, because in a sense it is. On the other
hand, I think it could lead to frustration, if not certain kinds of delusion, to think
that they might actually listen or that, even if they listen, that it will actually
make a difference.
And if we think about the votes right now, and you can think about who we
are aiming to influence, and even if we influence them, will we start getting
better decisions about American Indian law? When we are talking about who we
want to influence and where the votes are, I think we need to be realistic, which
doesn't mean we shouldn't be trying to provide judges, including Justices, with
very good information of the kinds that were outlined this morning. It is just
that maybe our audience has to be bigger - all judges, not just the Supreme
Court, and much longer-term.
We are also influencing the way people think about Indian nations; getting stories
out about real Indian nations, like Chairman Melendez's nation, is part of our work,
whether we can see it in the next term or the term after or the term after that or not.
We are academics, and we have the benefit of considering a long time horizon for
the ways in which we influence knowledge and policy, and our audiences should be
geographically and temporally dispersed. Otherwise, we risk either distorting our
research and/or becoming despondent that it seems not to matter.
So I will now quickly go through some work that I did studying the Navajo
Nation. The paper, the article itself, didn't just cover taxation.64 I attempted to
cover, and I'm sure I did it insufficiently, the whole range of governmental
powers that are affected by federal law.
I looked at the period from 1991 through 2001 and tried to get an answer to
the following question in a very preliminary way: what difference does the
federal law about legal sovereignty make to the ways tribes actually enact their
sovereign powers on the ground? Because, as I think we have all observed,
there's not a lot of information about that.
In our field we tend to pull our hair out about this or that Supreme Court
decision. We do that, I think, not because we care that much about the formalisms
of legal sovereignty. I don't.65 I care about what the Court says about sovereignty
because I care about the effects on the world and what happens to Indian
64. See Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the
Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REv. 1109 (2004).
65. See Sarah Krakoff, The Virtues and Vices ofSovereignty, 38 CoNN. L. REV. 797 (2006).
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nations, Indian people and, of course, to the rest of us, too, because I believe we
would all be worse off without functioning, self-governing Indian nations. So
I thought I would try to go about trying to answer that question.
I picked Navajo because, getting back to the questions about access that were
raised this morning, I had good access to information and data on the Navajo
Nation. Having worked there, I know a lot of the people there. I got permission
from the legislative counsel's office and could do it all on the up and up and was
extremely fortunate to have that kind of access to information and data.
So here's how the study was structured. First, describing the cases that
recognize the inherent tribal power to tax: Colville,66 Merrion,67 and Kerr-
McGee68 - my favorite under-celebrated Indian law case because there was no
secretarial authority required, so it recognized actual inherent authority of tribes,
not just a quasi-delegated authority. So those are the cases recognizing the
inherent power to tax.
Kerr-McGee, of course, is very, very important to the Navajo Nation. They
named a holiday after it: "Sovereignty Day." There aren't too many other
jurisdictions, I would suggest, that recognize and celebrate and give everybody
the day off about the power to tax.
(Laughter.)
It always gets a little laugh, but also it is important, because this is about how
deeply I think people in Indian country feel about their government's
governmental powers, which tells a different story than we might tell with our
somewhat libertarian instincts, particularly in the West, about how we feel about
our government and its powers.
Okay, so what has the Navajo Nation done with its powers to tax? Quite a
lot, and, again, this dovetails really nice with the Chairman's comments, because
one of the things that I did study and write about was the sales tax.
Starting right when they were - well, just preceding actually - when their
inherent legal authority to tax was affirmed, they passed a possessory interest
tax, an oil and gas severance tax, hotel occupancy tax, tobacco products tax, fuel
excise tax, and then in 2001 - the sales tax.
The sales tax was undertaken very, very thoughtfully. As Chairman
Melendez has mentioned, it was strategically conceived of to replace the stream
of revenue that comes from resource extraction. So taxation is a sustainable
form of revenue. And all environmentalists should be in favor of taxation, right,
66. Colville, 447 U.S. at 153.
67. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
68. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 731 F.2d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1984).
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because it has a lesser toll on the environment than, say, pulling coal out of the
ground.
It was the brain child of the former president, Peterson Zah, and the Navajo
Nation did a lot of studies among its people to make sure that they would be
comfortable with this because sales taxes are, of course, regressive taxes. When
you pass a regressive tax that is going to fall on a very impoverished population,
you want to do it carefully, in the right way, and make sure it has acceptance of
the people, and it did.
So the sales tax took the form of, after all this study, three percent of gross
receipts. The legal incidence falls on the seller, but is passed on to the buyer.
I will talk a little bit more about that three percent figure in a second.
So where does the tax money go on the Navajo Nation? Twelve percent goes
to a permanent trust fund. Again, this is a renewable source of income. That
was, again, conceived of by President Zah to replace the resource extraction
money.
Some of the tax revenue goes to land acquisition, which is a very important
function for most Indian nations, and for many even more so than Navajo, which
has a relatively large and intact land base.
The tax money also goes to fund tourism, roads, all the basic stuff of
government; some of it goes into a general fund, and then some revenue goes
back to the chapters, so they can do more local government and infrastructure.
Part of the point here is - this is what researchers often do is state the
obvious, right? - this is a government functioning like any other government,
I think. Painting that picture was very important and one of my objectives in
doing this work, because it seems to be a crucial bit of knowledge missing from
the way some courts think about tribes.
Now what about the cases in which the Court has allowed concurrent taxation
to occur in Indian country? Again, we are all familiar with these. Moe v.
Salish,69 Colville;7" Cotton Petroleum,71 in particular, stands out, as the case that
allowed for states to tax non-Indians extracting resources within Indian country;
and then Milhelm Attea,72 which reallyjust heightened the kinds of burdens that
states can impose on tribes when they are collecting their taxes.
69. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463
(1976).
70. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980).
71. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 177-78 (1989).
72. Dep't of Taxation & Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea, 512 U.S. 61 (1994).
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Cotton is one of the cases that academics really get upset about. So it was
interesting to find out - and, again, this is consistent with Chairman
Melendez's remarks - that in many respects the concurrent taxation cases,
while doctrinally very problematic, have fewer effects on the tribes' de facto
sovereignty, to borrow Cornell and Kalt's terms,"3 than the categorical
exclusion cases, which I will talk about next, because tribes can react to their
neighboring governments and can go to them and say, "Let's create a win-win
situation."
Neither government wants an economic environment in which multiple
layers of taxes discourage business and investment. And the tribal attorneys
who crafted these agreements were quite explicit about the way that they talked
about the economics here. Amy Alderman, who I know John Dossett works
with, too, was extremely helpful and provided me with a lot of information, the
back story to these agreements.
The tribal officials would go to the states and say, "Nobody wants an
unfriendly tax environment such that nobody's doing business on the Navajo
Nation because then neither government gets any money. So let's reach a
deal." The result is to enter into agreements that essentially cap the tax at the
maximum level of the state tax and then the two governments share the
revenues. So that is what a lot of those intergovernmental agreements are
about.
It would be very helpful, I think, to have a much larger sense of the extent
to which this is going on - that is something that John mentioned this
morning - and a much larger sense, too, and this is where we could come in
here and be helpful, we academics, on the difference that it actually makes.
What difference does it make to revenue for Indian nations and neighboring
governments when these agreements are reached? Are they actually
economically beneficial to everyone, and so on? So there's definitely more
work that could be done.
Now there are impacts that are negative in terms of tribal revenue, as one
might expect. The sales tax is only three percent. In Boulder, where I live, it
is about seven percent.
So when you are in a dual-taxation environment, does each government get
less? Well, certainly, right? So that is a negative impact. Then there are other
hidden impacts.
73. See Stephen Cornell & Joseph Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for
Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES Do?
STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1, 14 (Stephen
Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992).
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The "lightbulb example," as I call it, I will just run through quickly. States
can tax non-Indians on certain items, like lightbulbs in the State of Arizona, but
not tribal members. In order to actually collect the tax fairly, you would have
to have a separate cash register when a white person walks into Bashas'
Supermarket and buys lightbulbs on an Indian reservation. But there is no such
thing.
So what the State Taxation Department accepts is Bashas' saying, "Oh, yeah,
we collected the tax and here it is," right? But, in fact, it means the tax is
spread evenly among non-tribal members and tribal members. So, essentially,
I get a break on my lightbulbs at Bashas' because I'm not actually paying the
full amount of State tax I should pay and tribal members are paying more.
I know it is a little obscure, but still, a little hidden impact of this dual
taxation regime. More work, again, should be done to flesh this out and discern
with more precision these kinds of impacts.
Finally, quickly, I'll just talk about limitations on the tribal power to tax.
We know now Indian nations can't tax non-Indians doing business on non-
Indian fee land unless they can fit their tax into one of the two Montana
exceptions. Part of this study was just trying to provide some backdrop and
context to this decision.
Atkinson Trading Post, i.e., Cameron Trading Post, sells itself as a gateway
to Indian culture. So there are many ironies here of their resisting tribal
jurisdiction. They hire, of course, a lot of the workforce from the Navajo
Nation. So they benefit from that. And they get fire and police protection,
which was argued before the Supreme Court, and they advertise themselves
quite explicitly on their website about how they're this gateway to Indian
culture. So that was just some context about the case that is always important
to provide, even though when it is provided, it doesn't seem to go anywhere
with the Court.
But what about the impacts on Navajo? Clearly, there's a revenue loss. It
is very clear, right? They use the hotels that are on fee land. Navajo can no
longer collect the hotel occupancy tax, and that's that. But because Navajo,
unlike many tribes, has a lot of trust land, they still are able to collect taxes
from a lot of hotels and B&Bs, twelve out of fourteen, that are on trust land.
Now it just so happens, not coincidentally, that the two biggest money-
making hotels are on fee land: Gouldings in Monument Valley, and Atkinson
itself. We could probably, again, use some research about the extent to which
that's true in Indian country generally. Does fee land play a role in terms of
where most of the revenue generation happens? If so, then these decisions are
much more meaningful on other Indian nations than on Navajo.
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I think a hidden story to the way that Atkinson and Strate together have
combined to have effects on the negotiating environment in Indian country is
that, now that the presumption is that non-Indians can resist jurisdiction, there
is a fight about negotiating every single right-of-way. So the Court has really
created a much more difficult and contentious negotiation environment than
existed prior to these decisions.
I suspect that that is not well-known to the Court, right? I mean this is a
classic example of common law interfering with contractual negotiations, right?
Again, more work can and should be done on that. My work on this was
certainly very preliminary.
Then, of course, in this group I'm sure I don't need to spend too much time
on the expressive effects of these kinds of decisions. The way that Indian
people and tribal leaders feel about their inherent powers is not abstract, right?
It's very emotional and concrete and connects directly to their sense of how
well they can continue to govern for their people. A couple of quotes from
prominent Navajo tribal members here, which I include in my article, provide
a sense of this:
Sovereignty is more of an experience than anything. The
experience of being on any reservation, taking into account the
tribe's culture, traditional practices, religion, how they see
themselves... Only when you have experienced it can you describe
what it is - for you.74
The Court is trying to do what the Congress and Executive Branch
have learned they cannot do - eliminate tribes."
And finally, here are some of my conclusions from this very preliminary
study about the impacts of legal decisions on the power to tax. First, with regard
to decisions that affirm the inherent power to tax: the Navajo Nation is
exercising its sovereignty to raise revenue for essential governmental programs,
and acting both uniquely as an Indian nation and yet similarly to other
governments. Second, with regard to the decisions allowing concurrent state
power: there are clear impacts on revenue, but also surprisingly positive
government-to-government relationships as a result. And finally, with regard
to decisions limiting the tribal taxing power: They are a blow to legal
74. Interview with LeVon Henry, Exec. Dir. of DNA-People's Legal Services in Window
Rock, Ariz. (Dec. 10, 2003) (on file with author).
75. Telephone Interview with Raymond C. Etcitty, Navajo Nation Legislative Counsel
(July 7, 2003) (on file with author).
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sovereignty, and create mischievous complications in the transactional
environment. But they are likely not as damaging to Navajo as to other tribes.
Finally, a few thoughts I just want to close with about future research: I think
it would be great to have more and better work like this done that compares
several different tribes to one another and can, therefore, assess things like,
what difference does it make that a tribe was heavily allotted? You know, what
difference does the presence of fee land make?
I think that some of the questions we might ask in that regard relate again
back to Chairman Melendez's remarks. I would be very curious to try to
design a study that looks at the extent to which being confrontational about
legal sovereignty affects actual de facto sovereignty on the ground compared,
for example, with strategies taken by Indian nations that probably feel like they
have a weaker legal case and, therefore, do more in the way of exercising de
facto sovereignty without going through litigation.
What I have in mind is comparing, for example, Navajo, which has litigated
its sovereignty, and it was very successful up to a point, right, up until very
recently, with, say, Southern Ute. The Southern Ute Tribe has been very
successful economically. It is heavily allotted, but they have a lot of natural
resources, and they have done a lot with their de facto sovereignty on the
ground while, avoiding a lot of the legal battles.
So that, I think, would be quite interesting, and such a study could be
undertaken in the taxation context or any number of regulatory contexts, asking
different kinds of questions about what tribes are doing.
We certainly need more information about intergovernmental agreements
generally, the kind that the Reno-Sparks tribe has engaged in and Navajo and,
again, the difference that they make, right? What features do they have, and
how do they affect the economic picture, and how they affect relations, more
generally, with local and state governments.
And I could go on. There's no shortage of research ideas. There certainly
is a shortage of time, and then in my case expertise, but I'm going to go home
and call up my sociologist friends and political scientists, because, believe me,
I don't think I want to do that stuff on my own.
So those are just some thoughts. I hope I have done a good enough job of




MR. FLETCHER: Well, I'm going to take the first question. I'm curious
about what both of the participants here have to say about Justice Ginsburg's
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